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This thesis is a study of spectrum allocation by market
incentives as an alternative to the conventional block allo-
cation scheme administered under government regulation. A
description of electromagnetic radiation and a brief history
of allocation introduce this study. The principal elements
of concern are allocative efficiency under regulation, tech-
nology and spectrum substitutability in a user's production
decision, and the problems inherent in a spectrum market,
specifically, property right definition, negative externali-
ties of spectrum use, and transaction costs. The potential
of a spectrum market incorporating optimal pricing techniques
similar to transportation congestion models is investigated.
This study concludes by proposing a detailed mechanism for
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I. INTRODUCTION
The spectrum is a unique natural resource. It is not
confined by geographic or political boundaries. It cannot
be exhausted through use, nor can it be worn out. When spec-
trum is overused it suffers from congestion just as water or
air can be polluted by misuse or inefficient management.
But, unlike other resources, once the cause of congestion
ceases, the spectrum is completely reconstituted without
appreciable cost. Unfortunately, the useful range of radio
signals is much less than their interference range; trans-
missions do not cease abruptly at a fixed distance from the
transmitter. Indeed, the transmitted signal is affected by
constraints of natural phenomena which are unpredictable.
Despite these idiosyncracies the resource of the spectrum
has considerable application in modern society.
By administratively controlling spectrum use through
government regulation, the Federal Communications Commission
is the principal player in spectrum management for the com-
mercial sector. The Commission decides who should receive
and who should be denied access to the spectrum. Fueled by
technological improvements, society's omnivorous demand for
information has created an alarming scarcity of spectrum.
Despite the value of spectrum to society as a natural resource
and the rapidly decreasing supply, market considerations
are not a factor in the Commission's spectrum management
program. There exists no mechanism whereby the spectrum

like other resources can be purchased in the amounts required,
nor can the right of ownership be transferred to an individual
most willing to pay for it. Additionally, there is no value
in not using spectrum because future returns will always be
zero without any price-setting mechanism. Nevertheless, at
the current time, there is no direct charge for use of the
spectrum. Users have little or no reason to use it effici-
ently or to consider what others must give up when they use
a particular portion of the spectrum. As a result, the spec-
trum is under-utilized in some portions and extremely con-
gested in others. Moreover, there is no method which could
reapportion spectrum use based on an individual's willing-
ness to pay for an addition portion.
If a market for spectrum is created, it might give a
better indication of what is given up when spectrum is allo-
cated. The introduction of economic incentives in a spectrum
market may cause greater allocative efficiency in spectrum
use. This thesis proposes such a spectrum market.
By examining the current regulatory process and the allo-
cation decision rules of the firm, a basis is provided for
proposing a spectrum market. A simple description of the
technical problems inherent in the propagation of electro-
magnetic radiation is given in Chapter II. A brief history
of the current allocative method and its associated problems
are presented in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, a few of the
more significant spectrum market proposals are discussed.
Chapter V investigates the firms production input choices

at the margin, the difficulties with externalities and
transaction costs, and some parallels with transportation
congestion models. From requirements derived in preceding
chapters, chapter VI proposes a limited market for spectrum
allocation in s specific service. It describes a feasible
plan whereby optimal resource allocation decisions can be
made by the firm. The conclusion, Chapter VII, offers a
summary of the market proposed and some final remarks on
the need for improved spectrum management.

II. THE PHYSICAL NATURE OF THE SPECTRUM
A. ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM DIMENSIONS
1. Definitional Aspects of Spectrum
The electromagnetic spectrum is the set of all fre-
quencies on which electromagnetic radiation is possible.
Described by frequency, bandwidth, spatial volume, and time,
electromagnetic radiation is characterized by a constantly
expanding wave front, consisting of an electric and magnetic
field at right angles to each other, which describes the
boundary of some spatial volume in time [34, p. 430]. The
velocity of wave front propagation for any frequency in free
space is the speed of light. Although different frequency
ranges of the spectrum possess different characteristics,
i.e., sunlight, x-ray, radio waves, they all obey identical
physical laws. Radiation is transmitted from a source,
expands through space and time and that portion of the wave
front incident to the receiver is captured.
Electromagnetic radiation is a form of wave motion
with wavelength or frequency as the primary parameter. Wave
length is the physical distance between the peaks of an
unmodulated wave while frequency is the number of waves or
cycles passing a fixed point ppr unit time period. This is
usually described as cycles per second or hertz (Hz) , after
its discoverer. The set of radiated frequencies defined in
hertz comprises the electromagnetic spectrum. These are
generally arranged by frequency in ascending order from low
10

frequency radio waves up through visual light to high fre-
quency gamma radiation.
The portion of the electromagnetic spectrum con-
sidered usable for communications is the set of frequencies
from 3 kilohertz (KHz) to 3000 giga hertz (GHz) . Of this
set, up tc 275 GHz is currently allocated internationally
and use of the radio spectrum above 30 GHz is restricted
primarily tc research work [45, p. B-4] . It is clear that
available technology imposes a constraint on the amount of
spectrum available for practical communications applications.
The transmission of a single frequency is not
sufficient for radio communications [57] purposes. To
convey information, a range of frequencies must be used.
This range is the bandwidth and is measured in hertz from the
highest to the lowest frequency required. For each informa-
tion-carrying application a certain specified amount of band-
width is required. More about this characteristic will
follow.
The time dimension of electromagnetic spectrum is
relatively straightforwarward. Because radio waves propa-
gate at the speed of light, a close approximation would be
to consider them as instantaneously occupying a spatial
volume. When transmission ceases, so does this occupancy.
The three dimensional physical space which radio
waves occupy can be described only in a probabilistic sense.
The volume of space occupied is a function of power trans-
mitter, antenna design, the transmitted frequency and the
11

wave front propagation mode. The transmitted power deter-
mines the magnitude of the electric and magnetic fields
comprising a radio wave. As the wave moves away from the
source, the magnitude of the fields decreases. This attenu-
ation is inversely proportional to the square of the dis-
tance from the wave front boundary to the source. In the
case of an isotropic or point source, the wave front
expands equally in all directions and the energy of the
fields is spread over an ever increasing area. Then, at
any distance from the source the energy incident to the
receiver is only a portion, orders of magnitude smaller,
than that transmitted. Equally important is that the
energy not captured by the receiver continues on through
space though at ever decreasing levels of energy [25, p.
36] .
The shape of the volume occupied is to a large extent
defined by the antenna. Antennas need not be omnidirectional;
in fact, by focusing the energy into a narrow beam, greater
transmission distances can be obtained because of the
higher concentration of energy for a given transmitter power.
B. PROPAGATION
Radiation propagation reflects the unique nature of the
earth's environment. The major portions of this environment
which affect radio propagation are the atmosphere and the
surface of the earth of which 71% is water, a highly conduc-
tive compound [18, p. 1-1].
12

The upper portion of the atmosphere is the ionosphere
which is characterized by an increased concentration of free
electrons caused by radiation from the sun. The radiation
forms belts of increased ionization which can be distinguished
by their relative free electron densities.
Sunlight and sunspot activity have a strong effect on
electron levels so that these belts of ionization vary
diurnally and seasonally with the amount of solar radiation
incident to the ionosphere and cyclically with changes in
sunspot activity. This solar activity causes the levels or
layers to expand, contract and merge together.
While the height, thickness and electron density of each
layer cannot be predicted in a deterministic manner, proba-
bilistic estimates can be derived which provide some indica-
tion of actual ionospheric conditions. These estimates give
an indication of radio propagation characteristics as a func-
tion of frequency and time [18, p. 1-2].
The propagation mode also defines the volume of space
radio waves occupy. These major modes of propagation are
line-of-sight , refraction, and surface wave. These are by




In line-of-sight propagation the curvature of the
earth.' s surface determines the maximum range of a system
since the ground-based stations must theoretically be within
sight of each other. Ranges of 30 to 90 miles are possible
13

but are dependent upon antenna heights and the intervening
topography [18, p. 1-2]. The environment acts to limit the
electromagnetic wave by absorption in the lower atmosphere
and by refraction and multipath interference where two waves
from two apparent sources can reinforce or reduce each other
depending on geometry and atmospheric conditions. Precipi-
cation affects the use and reliability of the line-of-sight
mode. If antenna height or directivity is changed, consider-
ably longer distances are feasible and are directly propor-





The refraction mode of propagation, commonly called
the skywave mode, depends upon the ionosphere. The effective
range depends on the angle of the wave incident to the
ionosphere, the transmitted frequency, and the ionization
level. As the wave front enters the ionosphere it is
redirected and at suitable frequencies and layer altitudes
this redirection is sufficient to return the wave to earth
at a receivable energy level.
3 Ground Wave
Surface wave or ground wave propagation is used pri-
marily in the lower frequencies where the radiated wave is
propagated along the air-ground interface. At higher fre-
quencies the wave is attenuated too rapidly for practical
use. This mode is the most reliable and stable of all those





The level of noise incident to the receiver antenna is
a major determinant in the ability to receive a transmitted
radio wave. There are three basic elements of noise:
naturally occurring noise, unwanted radio waves from other
man-made sources, and internal noise [18, p. 1-1].
1. Natural Noise
Naturally occurring noise is received from outer
space, the sun and from any other naturally occurring
phenomena like thunderstorms. As seen by the fluctuation
of the ionized layers in the upper atmosphere, the sun causes
diurnal effects as well as cyclic effects. Cosmic noise
from outer space is also a function of electromagnetic
activity of other stars in space. The most unpredictable
sources of noise are electrical disburbances in the earth's
atmosphere. These effects can readily be heard on an AM
radio during a thunderstorm. While technological improve-
ments can minimize the effects of these unwanted signals,




Internal noise is inherent to the design of the
receiver. More technologically sophisticated equipments
can significantly reduce these unwanted effects.
3 Interference
Incidental man-made radiation, commonly called
interference, is the third major component of noise and is
the least predictable. Interference of this type may
15

emanate from electrical generating stations, automobile
ignition systems, or the citizens band buff in the neighbor-
hood. Also, each radio transmitter generates a signal which
can be considered as noise to someone trying to receive an-
other radio station's signal [26, p. 36]. In each case,
some unwanted electromagnetic energy has obstructed the
reception of the intended signal, degrading to some degree
the information content of that signal.
Three major forms of interference result from the
transmission of electromagnetic waves [35, p. 210]. First,
due to natural phenomena beyond the user's control, exten-
sive and unpredictable patterns of interference result.
Long range reception of AM radio stations is a prime example.
Second, interference results from the unconfinable nature
of radiation, particularly in regard to the technical prob-
lem associated with transmission. In this case, spurious
harmonics or radiation at multiples of the intended frequency
can be of sufficient energy level to cause interference.
The third source of interference results from intermodula-
tion products caused by simultaneous transmission at differ-
ent frequencies in the same geographical area. While neither
transmitter A or B alone could cause interference to C, if all
transmit simultaneously, B causes interference to C while A
causes no interference.
D. INFORMATION VALUE
Shannon's work on communication theory provides an
explicit method for calculating the theoretical limit of the
16

information capacity of an electromagnetic wave [57]
.
Measured in bits per second, the amount of information
transmittable is directly proportional to the bandwidth
and the ratio of the signal and noise energies captured
by the receiver. If greater information capacity is
desired, the bandwidth of the transmitted signal or the
power of the transmitter must be increased. This idea is
simple enough, but the technical implications are much
more constraining.
Emission bandwidth describes the size of the spectrum
segment required for a specific frequency assignment [18,
p. 2]. For example, a frequency assignment centered at
100,000 MHz with a bandwidth of 20 KHz would employ frequen-
cies ranging from 99.99 MHz to 100.01 MHz. The bandwidth
can be only a small percentage of the transmitted frequency
because the various electronic components of the transmitter
have only a limited frequency response. These components
are designed for optimum efficiency at the transmitted fre-
quency. At frequencies outside of the desired bandwidth,
their efficiency is so poor that use of an increased band-
width is technically impossible. Therefore, at lower fre-
quencies, even though transmitter output may be on the order
of millions of watts, only a very small bandwidth and
hence, information capacity, is available. Conversely,
in the Super High Frequency CSHF) range, those frequencies
from 3-30 GHz, this sane ratio may allow bandwidths as
large as 500 MHz; however, extreme transmitter power
17

limitations, and the severe attenuation suffered by signals
in this frequency range cause an appreciable reduction in
information capacity. Because of the available bandwidth,
the amount of information capacity of the higher frequencies
is orders of magnitude greater than that available at the
lower end of the spectrum [18, p. 2]. Hence, some degree
of spectrum differentiation in i-erms of potential uses is
possible.
The special characteristics of propagation mode and noise
clearly illustrate the difficulty in defining the effects of
electromagnetic radiation in other than a very probabilistic
sense. The spectrum's multiple dimensions and ability for
simultaneous use also provide some insight into the complex
problem of efficient use. Being unable to completely solve
the problem of spatial confinement by technology, some other
form of control is required. Controlling interference is the






A. THE EVOLUTION OF CONTROL
1. Early History
In 1906, only ten years after Marconi was first able
to demonstrate a practical method of electromagnetic trans-
mission, and only five years after the first trans-oceanic
telegraphy signal was received, the representatives of the
industrialized nations met in Berlin to reach a common under-
standing in the use of electromagnetic spectrum [45, p. B-l]
In the early 1900 's, the only frequencies that available
technology could utilize were in the kilohertz range [25,
p. 14] . Even low power signals in that portion of the spec-
trum can travel extraordinary distances by ground wave propa-
gation. This fact, coupled with the poor quality of oscil-
lators which, controlled the output frequency and the equally
deficient filters which allowed transmission of strong harm-
onic signals, caused interference problems despite the rela-
tively small number of transmitters available [25, p. 15] .
To avoid this problem of interference, new stations chose
initial locations up to 50 miles from previously installed
transmitters operating on the same frequency [25, p. 15].
Since the majority of users were maritime companies and
large ships, choice locations were quickly obtained. By
1906, concern for safety at sea, interoperability, and inter-
governmental use of the spectrum prompted convening the
Berlin Conference [7, p. 2]. The international agreement
19

resulting from the conference was the first instance of
spectrum allocation. Five hundred and 1,000 KHz were desig-
nated as the primary public service frequencies for ship-to-
shore radio communication [45, p. B-3] . Despite rapid tech-
nological change and more refined allocation techniques,
the 500 KHz assignment has remained to this day the primary
international distress and calling frequency. In these
formative years of international spectrum allocation the
impetus for centralized control was not spectrum scarcity
but rather frequency coordination, especially since there
was an element of public good involved in the use of wire-
less telegraph. The distinctive feature. of public goods:
....is that they can be consumed by more than one
person at the same time at no extra expense; and it
actually costs something to exclude potential
consumers [37, p. 524].
A prime example of a public good is a television signal.
Anyone living within the prescribed service area of the sta-
tion can enjoy its programming at no extra expense to the
station. Another example is the Coast Guard's weather
service broadcast. It costs nothing for an additional sub-
scriber and it would be nearly impossible to identify unin-
tended users. This notion of public good is to pervade the
entire regulatory history of the spectrum.
The problem was not one of finding a suitable
frequency but was one of insuring that no one else had also
found it. Since the major early application of radio teleg-
raphy was maritime safety, regulations concerning mandatory
radio equipment were quickly enacted [7, p. B-2] . The
20

obvious benefits resulting from international coordination
could be easily measured in lives saved and cargoes protec-
ted. Government provided a central decision making author-
ity which could oversee frequency assignments. Assignment
decisions did not determine who should operate. Instead,
they were concerned only with coordination. The decisions
to specify services for particular frequencies were effected
because the positive externalities of these decisions out-
weighed the potential negative effects of restricting the
type of service available at a particular frequency. Posi-
tive externalities exist whenever the consumer is unable to
capture all the benefits from a service [37, p. 13]. There
was more than enough spectrum [25, p. 15]. Natural abundance
made spectrum truly a free good.
2. International Telecommunication Union
The theme of international coordination has continued
since those first foundational attempts at allocation. Under
the eyes of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
,
the amount of spectrum allocated for specific services has
continued to increase up to the current limit at 275 GHz.
Essentially, the ITU provides an international forum
for frequency allocation. To facilitate coordination, the
world is divided into 3 regions [53, p. 166] . Each country
in a region is allocated portions of the spectrum for spe-
cific services. International administration of spectrum
allocation permits coordination of user services worldwide,
especially air and maritime mobile applications. Requests
21

for additional spectrum are responded to on a first-come,
first-serve basis. Actual use of the spectrum is not
material to the allocation decision. Hence, there was
considerable speculation prior to WARC 79 that emerging
third world countries seeking parity with more industrial-
ized nations would seek to stockpile spectrum in an attempt
to provide future telecommunications security [53, p. 166].
Major shifts in allocation were feared because of the im-
pact on capital investments. For the industrialized
nations, huge expenditures would be necessary to change to
new frequencies.
B. U. S. REGULATORY BODIES
As the need for some form of international cooperation
increased after 1906, so too were increased problems
affecting spectrum users within the U. S. Since wireless
telegraphy was used primarily for maritime applications,
the Navy- became instrumental in guiding federal government
policy, urging passage of a law "placing all wireless sta-
tions under the control of the Government" [7, p. 2]
.
While advocating their position, the Navy recognized "that
such a law passed at the present time might not be accept-
able to the people of this country" [7, p. 2], The Navy's
perceptions were correct; in 1912 Congress, fearful of
bestowing "too great powers upon the departments of the
government," passed the Radio Act of 1912 which required all
radio stations on a first-come, first-serve basis, to obtain
22

a license from the Secretary of Commerce, stipulating opera-
ting conditions [7 , p. 2] .
Under Mr. Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce, a series
of Radio Conferences, starting in 19 22, were held to discuss
the serious increase of interference caused by the fledgling
but rapidly growing AM broadcasting industry [9, p. 17].
Operating between 535 and 2000 KHz, existing stations were
suffering excessive interference because of the long range
characteristics of that portion of the spectrum. Coordina-
tion was non-existent. In fact, various court decisions
ruled that Mr. Hoover had exceeded his authority as defined
in the 1912 Act and, by mid-19 26, had insured governmental
noncontrol by withdrawing any restriction over frequency
choice or hours of operation [7, p. 5]. By 19 27, the need
for relief was acute. Indeed, during the period 19 22-19 24
alone, the number of broadcasting stations increased from
30 to 5QQ 146, p. 54QJ . In response, Congress created the
Federal Radio Commission to coordinate interference and
scarcity problems and to oversee the public good problem.
Although, broadcast listeners were beneficiaries of broad-
casting, they had little say in programming decisions. It
was thought necessary that, as the elected representatives
of the public, Congress ought to impose programming restric-
tions on the broadcasters to insure that the interests of
the public were served [7, p. 10]. The basic principles of
this 1927 Radio Act became the foundation for the 1934
Communications Act. Created by this act was the Federal
23

Communications Commission (FCC) as an independent regulatory
agency.
1 . Federal Communications Commission
Under the provisions of the Communications Act, the
Commission regulates all non-government telecommunications
through a process of legislatively mandated rule making.
The Communications Act specifically exempts "Radio stations
belonging to and operated by the government" [45, p. C-l]
from the provisions of the Act and provides that such sta-
tions will use frequencies as designated by the President.
"The Commission is essentially faced with two basic
responsibilities. First, we are charged with allo-
cating and assigning radio frequencies so as to in-
sure that orderly use is made of this valuable and
scarce public resourse. Second, we are empowered to
act as a surrogate for market forces in assuring
that the price, quantity, and quality of telecommuni-
cations services offered by natural monoplies corres-
pond with competitive market solutions" [24]
.
In meeting these responsibilities, the FCC divides,
spectrum management into three functional areas [10, p. 3].
First, the Commission allocates bands of the radio spectrum
for the specific use of various services. Second, it
assigns small segments of the spectrum within those bands
to most individual users. Third, it details applicable
technical standards and other user regulations pertaining
to the legal use of the individual assignments. Each of
these functions contributes in part to the overall regula-
tory effort of the FCC.
Allocation is a spectrum management function by
which "the radio spectrum is subdivided into bands that
24

are reserved for providing different types of communication
services" [10, p. 3]. This function recognizes the economies
of scale and operational benefits derived from restricting
the type of service offered in a particular allocation. It
allows an orderly expansion of existing services by recog-
nizing anticipated future spectrum needs. Also, by requiring
a specific spectrum use within each allocation, the inter-
ference resulting from adjacent disparate users is hopefully
avoided. Because of these characteristics, this management
function is commonly referred to as block allocation.
Assignment is the administrative process by which
individuals are licensed to use a small segment, a channel,
or an allocation band of the spectrum [10, p. 5]. On
successful application of an eligible individual, the
Commission issues a license to operate and it also assigns
a specific channel. Depending on the service, some assign-
ments may be exclusive, e.g., television, or they may be
shared with a number of other licensees as in the common
channel land mobile service. Also, it is possible that more
than one channel may be assigned a licensee for a particular
application.
Technical regulation is intended to ensure techni-
cally efficient use of the spectrum and to control inter-
ference between users. Technical efficiency is controlled
by establishing maximum acceptable levels of harmonic
emission and by requiring that modulation techniques accom-
modate a minimum level of information carrying capacity.
25

Interference is controlled by requiring compliance with
standards applicable to each license. Station characteris-
tics controlled include power output, antenna height, and
directivity, station separation distances, and authorized
transmission times.
These three functions of the FCC are "carried out
by rule making, using the notice and comment procedures
specified by the Administrative Procedures Act" [10, p.
6] . No preference is given a prospective applicant in an
uncongested service. Licenses are awarded on a first-come,
first-served basis [10, p. 6]. However, in the case where
an insufficient number of channels are available to satisfy
all the applicants, the Commission resorts to formal adjudi-
catory procedures to determine the successful applicants.
As various rulings are tested in court, a more comprehensive
structure detailing spectrum applications is created. Hence,
there is a complex interaction of technical, social, politi-
cal, and legal requirements which dictates the nature of
spectrum regulation by the FCC.
2. Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee
While it has been in existence since 19 22, the Inter-
departmental Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) is less well
known [9, p. 18]. Its genesis was a recommendation by the
chairman of the first Radio Conference to then Secretary of
Commerce, Mr. Hoover, that the government should also have
an oversight body which could provide frequency coordination
in the public sector [9, p. 19]. This was before the
26

Federal Radio Commission, the precursor of the FCC, was
formed. In essence, IRAC serves as the governmental fre-
quency assignment agency and consists of representatives
from the major government aaency spectrum users. IRAC
receives policy guidance for strategic planning from the
National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA)
which operates under the Secretary of Commerce. The NTIA,
formed in 1977, is responsible to the President for issuance
of frequency assignments.
Both IRAC and the FCC make use of the same National
Table of Frequency Allocations which lists all frequencies
by user categories. This table is in turn derived from the
portion of the ITU Table of Frequency Allocation specific
to the United States [45, p. B-6] . Both tables are under
continuous revision. The national table reflects the cur-
rent rulings of the FCC and NTIA, being amended as new
rulings occur [45, p. D-l]
.
There is no formal mechanism for resolving competing
claims between these two agencies for frequency assignment
[9, p. 22]. Instead, an informal arrangement characterized
by mutual cooperation provides solution to competing requests
for identical assignments.
"The Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee will
cooperate with the Federal Communications Commission
in giving notice of all proposed actions which would
tend to cause interference to nongovernment station
operation, and the Federal Communications Commission
will cooperate with the Interdepartmental Radio
Advisory Committee in giving notice of all proposed
actions which would tend to cause interference to
27

government station operation. Such notifi-
cation will be given in time for the other agency
to comment prior to final action. Final action
by either agency will not, however, require approval
by the other agency" [9, p. 22].
While this statement may seem modern, it was made
40 years ago and fully illustrates the two bodies' desire
for continued mutual cooperation. Thus, between the FCC
and IRAC, the government regulates control of any portion
of spectrum authorized by the ITU for use by the United
States
.
Today the nature of the FCC regulatory process con-
tinues unchanged. Assignments for all services are made
subject to administrative regulatory constraints.
C PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Since 1950 the effectiveness of government management
in frequency allocation and application supervision has been
the subject of investigation and criticism. The Communica-
tions Policy Board in 1950 attacked the split responsibility
of IRAC/FCC.
"Existing organization to control use of the spectrum,
one of the most valuable natural resources of the
United States, is responsible for the establishment
or continuance of dual control of this resource. This
dual control has led to friction, misunderstanding,
waste and avoidance of responsibility. The organiza-
tion is lacking in overall policy guidance, and is so
complex that few persons understand all its
ramifications" [51, p. 47J
.
They argued that spectrum allocation was being made
under procedures which, cannot weigh all the demands by
government and commercial interests for spectrum use. The
Board continued that it was impossible to make impartial
judgements on fixed criteria with insufficient information.
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Mi sallocation between government and commercial interest
was criticized by the Joint Technical Advisory Committee (JTAC)
in 1968 [28] . JTAC had misgivings about the division of allocation
responsibility and the block allocation procedures [28, p. 24].
While the Charter under which JTAC operated "makes
inappropriate the drawing of any conclusion as to the
governmental organization necessary to provide these expanded
spectrum engineering capabilities," the immense scope of the
spectrum management problem was well understood [28, p. 73].
Continuing enlargement of technical resources in
microwave, personal radio, communications satellites,
etc., has made practical a wide variety of radio
communications. As a result, high density urban
living, increased mobility of people at work or play,
and our natural desire to keep in touch have brought
us to the point v/here there are unsatisfied demands,
conflicts and constraints in further utilization of
the electromagnetic spectrum [23, p. 2].
Finally, the point has been reached where we have
to face up to the fact that the usable spectrum is
a limited resource ... .The challenge lies in develop-
ing a new philosophy and new techniques in spectrum
management that recognize this new administrative
environment [23, p. 3].
The President's task force on Communications Policy
concluded that efficient use of the spectrum was not being
achieved primarily because the block allocation procedures
were not responsive to the demand for spectrum [52, p. 8:
26-23]
. Also criticized were the vague criteria available
to the spectrum manager for resolution of conflicting claims.
Under the 1934 Communication Act, allocation is to be made
in "the public interest, convenience or necessity" [7, p.
13J . The task force argued that economic factors should be
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introduced into the allocation procedure, especially in
light of competitive claims, to promote efficiency and pro-
vide an economic evaluation of spectrum.
Use of the spectrum should be subject to more direct
economic forces in the future rather than being
treated as a free right. It is of real economic
value to the user which should be fairly reflected
in allocation of the resource The direct bene-
ficiaries should be called upon to bear a fair share
of (the) costs. Economic incentives would also
encourage users to apply their innovative skills
toward more efficient spectrum use [52, p. 33].
While not a novel idea (it was novel to Adam Smith) , the
task force declined to mention how a spectrum market would
be operated.
Two major characteristics of the commercial spectrum
management system are:
1. It is relatively inexpensive.
2. It lacks flexibility and requires a long time to
reach decisions [25, p. 19J
.
The FCC is inexpensive in terms of its budget, an argument
which might be used to maintain the current system. However
,
this may be a tip-of-the-iceberg situation. The true social
cost of spectrum management includes the opportunity costs
of uses foregone by the block allocation system. Also,
lengthy hearings generate significant transaction costs, not
the least of which is the discounted value of idle spectrum.
It is the entire economic cost which should be considered,
not just budget expenses. The second characteristic cor-
rectly identifies the inability of the FCC to rapidly respond
to technology change and, instead, maintain the vested inter-
ests of current users whether efficient or not.
30

These same criticisms are expanded by Agnew et. al.
to four specific elements which describe the inefficiencies
of current spectrum management [1, p. II-5] . They are:
1. Costs and delays of comparative hearings.
2. That certain portions of the spectrum have greater
valuation in terms of use than other portions.
3. Less intensive or profitable use than is techni-
cally possible.
4. The "free good" aspect.
An additional fifth element concerns the subjectivity of
the licensing procedure and the equity of the subsequent
decision. All five elements are illustrated to describe
current system inefficiencies.
1. Costs and Delays
The licensing procedure can consume an inordinate
amount of time and prove costly. It is mandatory when two
or more applicants seek the same assignment. A case in
point is the application Mr. Buchner made in 1952 for owner-
ship of Station WFTV in Orlando, Florida [13] . While the
particulars read "like a soap opera/' there is no denying
that the inability of the FCC to reach a decision can be
the source of economic aggravation by precluding any effec-
tive long run planning. A decision over the ownership of
WFTV is still outstanding.
The costs of both legal representation in these
administrative hearings and more importantly the social cost
of unused but highly demanded spectrum are not reflected in
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the FCC budget. These costs can be substantial even if the
calculations are conservative. The costs of hearings are
calculated as the sum of the hearing cost including all legal
and staff fees and the value of the spectrum as lost profits
discounted over the period the frequency assignment is idle
[55] . Since transaction costs may differ with the number of
applicants, whether actual hearings are held or a mutual
settlement is reached among the applicants, it may be impos-
sible to construct an algorithm for predicting costs. What
is important, however, is that the regulation which is in-
tended to reduce transaction costs may actually be causing
an increase in such costs. On balance, it appears improve-
ments can be made.
2. Differences in Spectrum Valuation
Under the current block allocation scheme, portions
of the spectrum are set aside for specific use. The under-
lying reason is to deny disparate use of the spectrum in
adjoining portions of the spectrum in an effort to reduce
the. interference from intermodulation or spurious harmonics.
Hopefully, there is sufficient bandwidth in each allocation
to satisfy all spectrum requirements. Unfortunately, the
desired result is not always obtained. The effort by the
land mobile users to obtain unused portions of the adjoining
UHF-TV band illustrates the problem. Land mobile radio has
shown a dramatic increase in demand to the point, almost,
of necessitating hearings over competitive applications for
already congested channels [6, p. 318], Simultaneously the
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UHF-TV allocation has many unused channels mainly because of
the marginal profitability of many of these stations [4, p.
45] . What results is two adjacent portions of the spectrum
differing greatly in valuation. It took ten years for FCC
dockets 18261 and 18262 to reallocate more spectrum for land
mobile use [22] [23]. However, the new allocation, made for
the entire country, may not reflect the needs of a particular
geographic area. The delay was necessary to insure that the
correct portion of the UHF-TV allocation was transferred in
the event the UHF-TV service became as profitable as once
imagined [1, p. II-6]
.
3 . Technical Inefficiency
In calculating the bandwidth of an assignment, the
FCC determines the requirements of current technology before
pronouncing its decision. In the case of broadcasting, the
overriding concern may not be the amount of spectrum cur-
rently necessary for a service but rather the size of the
current investment in receivers over which the broadcaster
has no control. In broadcasting, once bandwidth is deter-
mined ttie number of stations in any geographic area can be
determined given the bandwidth of the allocation [1, p.
II-5]
. The specific channels for each area are chosen such
that the same channel is not occupied in an adjacent area.
Hence, by determination of bandwidth, an absolute number
of stations is derived. But, assignments are fixed in time
while technology continues to improve.
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Currently deliberations to decrease the bandwidth
of AM radio stations from 10 KHz to 9 KHz are in progress.
An ITU region II Administrative Broadcast conference is
scheduled for March 1980 to standardize the AM broadcast
assignment at 9 KHz for the region which consists of North
and South America. Adoption of the new assignment would
permit offering AM stereo while creating up to 140 new sta-
tions in the U. S. [5].
There are two reasons for the adoption of 9 KHz
assignments. First, is to bring the Americas into agreement
with the rest of the world which currently uses 9 KHz
assignments. Border stations between two regions experience
interference because of the different assignment spacing.
Secondly, the FCC has over 5,000 applications for AM stations
pending [5] . Decreasing the bandwidth would permit satis-
fying some applicants and allow some current broadcasters to
upgrade their second class licenses to first class, essen-
tially gaining frequency protection to permit greater trans-
mission fidelity over a wider area [40]
.
Hence, while the system protects current users, it
is not necessarily responsive to new technology. Succinctly
stated
:
"Regulatory pressures alone, as we have applied them,
are not enough to bring about the introduction and
use of equipment designed to higher standards to
conserve spectrum or to make expensive changes to
benefit another user in the interest of efficient use
of the spectrum. ... Regulatory pressure will never
match the rewards that could come from self-motivated





4 . Spectrum as a "Free Good "
If a resource such as the spectrum can be consumed
without cost by a user, then it is, in essence, a "free
good." The government's policy of no charge for spectrum
use has undoubtedly intensified society's use of spectrum,
but it has also served "to stifle individual motivation
towards achieving more benefits in less spectrum space"
[45, p. A-7]
.
It is reasonable then to assume that the user's
choice of resource allocation will attempt to maximize use
of the spectrum. Since there is no mechanism which relates
the value of spectrum to its next best use, there is no
indication whether use of the spectrum is optimal or if
spectrum substitutes would provide a lesser cost alterna-
tive. An excellent example "is in television broadcasting,
which, provides the major substitute to cable television for
distributing television programs to homes. A TV transmitter
uses spectrum without paying for it; while a cable system
must be built from costly resources. A consequence of the
free nature of the spectrum is to make television look like
a less expensive way to distribute programs than it really
is" [1, p. II-7J . As shown in Chapter IV below, spectrum
as a free good makes it imperative to obtain the least cost
telecommunications equipment which typically uses more
A spectrum user could be an individual or a firm,




spectrum than is required by currently available but more
expensive equipment. Thus, the label "free good" is a mis-
nomer; there is a cost involved. Whether it is the broad-
casting station itself, the next best applicant for that
station, or the listener who doesn't like the programming,
who absorbs this cost is a matter of equity. What is impor-
tant is the fact that the current administrative system of
channel assignment is indisposed and ill-equipped to deal
with the "free good" aspect of spectrum management.
5. Subjective Determination of License Holder
In broadcasting, the FCC awards a license to the
"qualified" applicant best able to serve "in the public
interest." Each license comes due for renewal every three
years and the current holder may be challenged for posses-
sion by any applicant deemed "qualified" by the FCC.
Basically, qualification entails being financially capable
of operating the station and offering programming in the
public interest 110, p. 8]. Once granted a license, unless
moved by a desire to leave the industry, license renewal is
almost a rubber stamp procedure. An example of an exception
to this propensity is the recent FCC ruling that RKO General,
a subsidiary of General Tire and Rubber Co. , holder of 4 TV
and 13 other licenses, is no longer "qualified." This opens
the door to challenges for station WNAC-TV in Boston [62]
.
Three separate groups are in contention and each could be-
come instant millionaires if awarded the license. RKO was
unqualified because in the view of the commissioners, "the
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company could not be trusted in the future to operate WNAC-
TV in a manner consistent with FCC standards" [62] . The
reason for RKO ' s fall from grace stems, apparently, from
the parent corporation's problems in the early 19 60's with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, political slush
funds, and overseas bribery charges. These difficulties
were settled in a consent decree with the Justice Depart-
ment in 1970. There was never any alleged misconduct on
RKO's part, moreover the consent decree occurred three
license renewals ago [64]. At the same time, VJestinghouse
Broadcasting was awarded license renewals despite the
parent company's involvement in the notorious electrical
price-fixing scheme [63] . General Tire and Rubber Co.
intends to appeal the FCC ' s decision. This example describes
the possible inequity resulting from difficult and expensive
decisions. It also points out the potential capriciousness
of subjective decision making.
Given these shortcomings of the current al locative
method, recommendations to improve the responsiveness and
efficiency have grown in number and come from two camps,
the engineers and the economists.
The engineering approach is concerned with electro-
magnetic compatibility as defined by technical equipment
specifications. Indeed, each license granted by the FCC
contains the requirement to maintain strict adherence to
technical specifications. By controlling the input function
in such a precise manner the FCC provides an ad hoc
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description of the probability of interference between
adjoining stations [10, p. 4]. While not dismissing the
importance of precise engineering or the need to continue
technological improvements in electromagnetic compatibility,
the emphasis in this thesis is placed on the economic
aspects of the problem. Their approach is to remove or at
least reduce fiat allocation and allow market forces to
determine optimum allocations. Numerous proposals have
been made to provide a valuation of spectrum based on
market forces given that an excessive demand for a "free
good" has overwhelmed the available supply or the FCC's




IV. SPECTRUM MARKET TECHNIQUES
A. PRIOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Since 1959 when Coase published his article on the
Federal Communications Commission there have been several
proposals for instituting spectrum markets as a means for
both valuing the spectrum and providing a more efficient
allocative mechanism [1] [19] [21] [25] [31] [39] [41] [47]
[54] [55] [66]. These proposals exhibit a broad range of
characteristics. At one extreme the free market allows the
license holder complete freedom of use for the spectrum he
holds as defined by the property rights issued by the license
The property rights for spectrum use define time, frequency,
and three-dimensional space as the criteria for determining
the legal right to radiate. These output parameters consti-
tute the legal limit of the owner's right 'to radiate while
placing no restriction on the use of the owner's spectrum.
The limited market proposals as defined in this dis-
cussion are those in which the property rights of spectrum
are more restricted and are defined in terms of input param-
eters or rights. In these proposals property rights are
defined in terms of time, frequency and bandwidth, trans-
mitted power and antenna height as surrogate measures of
actual boundary radiation density. In most of the specific
market proposals input rights are used in lieu of output
rights because of the difficulty in defining or enforcing
the latter. Regardless of the method of property right
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definition, each proposal introduces economic incentives
into the spectrum allocation process
.
1. Free Market Proposals
While Coase provides no specific definition of
property rights and it could be inferred what he really
intended was the use of input rights; his work can be
grouped in the free market category primarily because he
makes a compelling argument for establishment of a pricing
system in a spectrum market [7] . It is the first major
work suggesting economic methods be applied to spectrum
allocation.
Despite the absence of a formal recommendation,
Coase ' s article is most important in recognizing the impli-
cations of transaction costs and externalities on the true
social costs incurred by the establishment of spectrum
market [7]
.
Minasian, in an extension of Coase' s work, defines
a set of rights which can be used in a market system [42]
.
As the scope of his work was primarily to provide a workable
definition of property rights, no market recommendation is






4. Transferability [42, p. 232]
In essence, the owner is free to use his portion of
the spectrum as he desires within the law, and he is able
to sell all or part of his property rights. The major
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distinction of Minasian's work is that the level of radiation
at some radius from the transmitter must not exceed a pre-
viously agreed level of energy. The same type of conditions
hold for the inevitable harmonics simultaneously transmitted.
In addition, those who seek to use any portion of the right-
holder's area would be limited to agreed-upon limits of
radiated energy density to afford interference protection to
the right-holder. As argued previously, the transaction
costs of property right measurement might exceed the benefits
gained.
DeVany et al. offer a more specific property right
definition. They postulate a Time, Area, Spectrum (TAS)
algorithm for property rights which essentially is an exten-
sion of Minasian's work [19]. This use of TAS units reflects
a considerably greater emphasis on the technical problems of
radiation transmission and associated interference. The
resulting definition of output rights forms the basis for the
four specific recommendations for spectrum markets in the
UHF-VHF bands which concludes the work. These proposals are:
1. Use of alternate VHF and intermediate UHF
television channels.
2. Clearing of adjacent UHF television and land
mobile channels.
3. Vesting FM broadcast rights.
4. Packing FM stations [19, p. 1537].
Each of these proposals is intended for experimental
use in demonstrating the adequacy of the TAS units in cre-
ating a spectrum market.
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2. Limited Market Proposals
Limited market proposals have been more prevalent
in recent work primarily because of the problems in adequately
defining property rights. The limited market proposals use
input rights to describe the property rights of the license
holder. Each proposal is restricted in scope to a particular
service, recognizing the difficulties associated with com-
bining different services in the same band.
The princioal proponent of the limited market idea is
Levin, whose book The Invisible Resource and numerous papers,
are a major effort to establish the need for economic incen-
tives in spectrum allocation [31] [32] [33] [34] [35].
Discussing the economic aspects of spectrum use in detail,
he advocates treatment of the spectrum in an economically
efficient manner. In addition, he examines the use of
shadow prices, auctions and calculated spectrum usage fees
as a price mechanism for spectrum allocation. Levin argues
the impracticality of specific property rights, like the TAS
units proposed by DeVany et al. He concludes that usage fees
and spectrum shadow prices as economic techniques should
receive greater consideration in establishing an economic
valuation of spectrum. This, in turn, would create a greater
incentive to conserve spectrum use than would administrative
allocation.
While Levin provides the most expansive treatment of
limited markets for spectrum, there have been other signifi-





Jackson makes four market proposals, the most signifi-
cant of which recommends a market for the geostationary
orbital slots of communications satellites [25, p. 71].
It consists of two main features: a defined orbit-
spectrum right and an auction of satellite slots. Both
features are organized under international aegis. The geo-
stationary orbit is divided into "segment shares" (SS's)
which are auctioned [25, p. 76]. Each satellite is defined
in terms of a "spacecraft right" (SCR) [25, p. 79].
Measured in degrees of arc, the SCR for any satellite is
determined so that the satellite neither causes interference
with nor is interfered by a "standard satellite" [25, p.
80] . Once the size of the SCR is determined, then suffici-
ent number of SS's are obtained at auction prior to registra-
tion with the International Frequency Registration Board
(IFRB)
,
the recording agent for the ITU. The market proposed
allows only rental, not sale, of SS's to discourage future
inefficiency and t<~> make spectrum prices more visible.
Agnew et al . take exception to some elements of this
proposal and restate them [1, p. XlI-2] . Specifically, they
argue that SCR must be defined not only for systems homo-
geneous to the standard satellite, but also for new technol-
ogy which should not be restricted for the sake of
homogeneity [1, p. XII-4] . The SCR's they propose differ
for broadcast and fixed service satellites. Essentially,
the SCR consists of a segment of geostationary orbit, a
geographical service area, and a frequency band defined for
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every satellite in the 12/14 GHz and 20/30 GHz band. In
addition, they propose that the duration of the grant be
indefinite, and that segment shares be fully transferable
to qualified operators [1, p. XII-9]. They continue with
an analysis of their modified Jackson Plan.
The modified satellite plan presented by Agnew et
al. is only part of a lengthy survey of economic techniques
for spectrum management [1] . In addition, they present
three other spectrum market methods and an analysis of
each. These techniques are frequency coordination, a
license auction system for multipoint distribution service
(MDS) , band assignment in land mobile radio, and the satel-
lite orbital slot mentioned above.
The frequency coordination technique is actually
in use but not widely recognized as an economic incentive
to more efficiently allocate spectrum. In frequency coordi-
nation, a potential entrant to the terrestrial microwave
or fixed satellite service in the 4/6 MHz band must obtain
an agreement among all current users that his entry in a
specific geographical area will cause no unacceptable inter-
ference. If interference will result, the newcomer can
choose to install interference shielding, redirect his
antennas or he may pay for any equipment modifications or
additional interference shielding at the interfered station.
Since the number of stations is limited, negotiations are
relatively straightforward and allow prospective operators
entrance to the market after interference reduction costs
are born by the newcomer.
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In the MDS proposal, the major issue is whether
auctions as proposed by Robinson or a lottery would prove
less costly than the public hearings now used for deter-
mining the successful applicant [55] . MDS is an interstate
common carrier service in the microwave band, broadcasting
multiple-addressed material to fixed receivers. Their anal-
ysis concludes that the English auction system provides a
Pareto-optimal least cost solution [1, p. VIII-16].
The band assignment model is an elaboration of a
previous proposal by Dunn and Owen [21] . It is character-
ized by the auction of bands which have bandwidths two or
three times that of current mobile channels. The successful
bidder has exclusive control over his band assignment allow-
ing operator choice of technology and usage. The licensee
is subject to out-of-band and out-of-area interference
standards like the technological specifications now required
by the FCC. Transfer of the license in whole or in part is
allowable.
Each of these market proposals deals with a specific
portion of the spectrum, uses input rights to define the
area irradiated and provides a scheme for payment of spec-
trum use. Without so stating, these proposals recognize the
unsuitability of spectrum substitution. That is, for a
given application or service only certain frequencies are
acceptable. Hence, the creation of a single spectrum market
is infeasible because there are essentially different commod-
ities, i.e., spectrum applications, being marketed. Also,
by segregating spectrum markets the technological problems

associated with modulation incompatibilities caused by
disparate uses are avoided.
B. METHODS OF SPECTRUM PRICING
Spectrum pricing methods fall into two basic categories.
In the first group are user fees. The second group consists
of auction systems. Each method attempts to capture the
users' willingness to pay in setting a market valuation of
spectrum.
1. User Fees
User fees are administratively determined charges
levied on the spectrum consumer. They can be determined by
fee formula or by an approximation of shadow prices.
Fee formulas, in general, attempt to capture the
spectrum users' willingness to pay for spectrum in a mathe-
matical formula. Using area served, bandwidth, channel
capacity, power density or other values as variables, a fee
is derived which hopes to equate the consumers' marginal
willingness to pay for each assignment. Fee formulas have
received some consideration in House and Senate proposed
rewrites of the 1934 Communications Act [1, p. IV-18]
.
There are two difficulties with this method. First, the
fee formula must be correct to optimize efficiency and
secondly, determining the value of the constant term found
in each formula is extremely difficult [1, p. IV-17]
.
The broadcaster fee formula F = aBN illustrates the
point [66, p. 65]. Here a is the constant and B is the
bandwidth in MHz. N is the population in millions receiving

the signal or excluded from receiving another signal on the
same frequency. (The value of N assumes an a priori deter-
mination of acceptable reception.) Unless there is some
external goal, i.e., minimum acceptable revenue, the value
of a is indeterminant [1, p. IV-2] . Indeed, its choice
requires that the marginal productivity of the bandwidth in
question be predetermined, which is what the pricing mechan-
ism is supposed to provide.
Shadow prices are derived from the maximum sums that
spectrum users are willing to pay rather than do without
some additional amount of bandwidth [35, p. 215]. The cal-
culation of shadow prices requires estimating opportunity
costs of alternative spectrum uses. It allows price estima-
tion without any actual payment occurring. Once calculated,
the spectrum manager allocates spectrum based on these
shadow prices. While intuitively appealing r difficulties
do arise. First, the information necessary for calculation
of shadow prices may be inaccurate, non-existent, or too
costly to obtain.
Also, there may be disagreement over whether the
shadow price reflects the willingness to pay of the profit
maximizing user or the market as a whole [2, p. 19]. Two
distinct definitions of shadow price must be considered.
There is the firm's shadow price (the value to the firm of
an additional unit of input) and the market shadow price
(which represents the price of the input if it were on a
competitive market) . The firm's shadow price is what Levin
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uses in calculating "a set of charges on occupied band-
width" [31, p. 118]. Because of the diverse supply and
demand schedules of individual firms, it may not be prac-
tical to find an average value for determining the market
shadow price. This is true because of the wide variation
in spectrum valuation under regulation; to the firm with
more than enough spectrum, its value may be essentially
zero, while the firm which needs more or is excluded from
using spectrum may value it highly. Additionally, inter-
allocation spectrum transfer would necessitate continuous
recalculation of the market shadow price as the market seeks
equilibrium [2, p. 18]. This would compound the difficulty
in translating the firm's shadow price into a market shadow
price in a market which may not exhibit all the character-





Auction systems have been proposed as a method of
placing the responsibility of price determination on the
user. An auction provides a potentially Pareto-optimal
mechanism for separating the indifferent user from a finan-
cially committed one [56, p. 489]. The actual auction tech-
nique may vary. A Dutch auction, where the highest bidder
pays that price or the English method, where the highest
bidder pays the second highest bid, may be used [61, p. 8].
Bids may be oral or sealed. Whichever the case, the winner
pays the government and obtains the license. However, in
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most cases, the license is not issued in perpetuity and must
be offered in public auction at some predetermined point in
time.
The stratified auction provides for bidding only
within a particular allocation [35, p. 216]. No interband
bidding is allowed. This method deals with the interference
problems caused by allowing technologically different users
access to proximate portions of the spectrum. From the
results of the auction, a shadow price representative for
that portion of the spectrum is obtainable. With relative
intraband auction values available, the spectrum manager
could reapportion spectrum allocations to avoid inequitable
or socially inefficient use.
Regardless of the market mechanism or price deter-
mination method chosen, it is essential that a proposed
system offer greater efficiency than that currently in opera-
tion. A viable market must cause the spectrum user to fully
internalize the social costs of spectrum use.
If a market is initiated, the transaction costs of
doing business must be minimized to permit active partici-
pation. Indeed, it is in part, because of excessive trans-
action costs, that regulation becomes necessary [29].
Implicit in a market is the nature of property rights and
the freedom of use that the right-holder enjoys.
The object of introducing economic techniques into
spectrum allocation is to improve social efficiency. A
positive price for spectrum use characterizes these
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techniques. It is important that the market allow the
individual firm the freedom to choose the amount of spectrum
necessary for efficient production. If each firm is afforded
this opportunity to make optimal resource allocation decisions,
then in the aggregate the market will be optimal. This
requires that each firm recognize the marginal social cost
of spectrum use. It is also necessary that certain charac-




V. ECONOMICS OF THE SPECTRUM MARKET
A. LIMITATIONS OF SPECTRUM SUPPLY
The spectrum is becoming an increasingly scarce resource.
Demand continues to increase for new assignments while the
supply of spectrum at any time is a function of available
technology. The scarcity problem is exacerbated by the
administratively controlled block allocation system which
dictates the level of technology usable for a given service.
This is especially true in broadcasting where the bandwidths
of each channel assignment have remained essentially unchanged
since the service was first adopted.
The available supply may be increased by two different
methods. The first method is accomplished administratively.
By changing the amount of spectrum allocated to a particular
service, increased supply can be detailed to one service at
the expense of another. The total supply is certainly not
enlarged, but by shifting allocations it is possible to in-
crease the supply of spectrum for a heavily demanded service.
Such expediency is only a short run appeasement of demand
and cannot in the long run provide an acceptable source of
supply. This action is in part a response to an artificially
high demand caused by administratively leveled constraints
on spectrum use through the current allocation process.
The other method to increase spectrum supply entails
the use of technology to increase both the "extensive" and
"intensive" margins of the spectrum [31, p. 19-24] . The
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former involves expanding the amount of spectrum available,
while the latter permits more users to occupy the same amount
of spectrum now available. The "extensive" margin has shown
dramatic increase in the past 70 years. In the early 1900'
s
the maximum usable frequencies were about 2 MHz. By 1980,
technology has improved to allow use of frequencies above
300 GHz, an increase of over 150,000 percent. Improvements
continue to be made and new regions opened for commercial
use.
On the other hand, development in the intensive margin
seeks to increase the number of uses in a fixed bandwidth
of the spectrum while maintaining an acceptable level of
interference. Interference and noise will never be elimi-
nated, but technology can control its impact on the user's
ability to provide a telecommunications service without
suffering intolerably high levels of interference. Any sort
of technological improvement which gives a better probabil-
istic estimate of the spatial volume occupied by a radio
wave creates greater spectrum capacity in a geographical
sense. Also, bandwidth reduction techniques, which improve
information capacity, permit more consumers to occupy the
same amount of spectrum bandwidth. These are improvements
in the "intensive" margin. Driven by technology, the expan-
sion of both the extensive and intensive margins has been
impressive. However, the demand for spectrum has increased
disproportionately to the increase in supply due, primarily,
to the dramatic decrease in electronics costs. Technology
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is a two-edged sword; on one hand it contributes to a greater
spectrum supply while, on the other, it provides an accessi-
bility to the spectrum unmatched in history. The pace of
recent developments in reducing cost does not seem to be
faltering; if anything, it is providing greater opportunities
for access. At some point demand will exceed supply and
serious congestion will result. This argument is not new.
" (The Navy) has for years sought the enactment of
legislation that would bring some sort of order out
of the turbulent condition of radio communication,
and ... it would favor the passage of a law placing
all wireless stations under the control of the
government..." [7, p. 2].
Serious congestion or spectrum pollution will preclude making
assignments to new applicants and will cause dissatisfaction
within the ranks of previously license^ operators. Even
though spectrum is now available at no rental cost to the
user, once excellent service is obtained it becomes an assumed
right that such conditions of service will persist.
In addition, under the current block allocation scheme,
specific uses are required in each allocation, and license
transferability is denied. The administrative mechanism
forces opportunity costs on spectrum users which could be
ameliorated if market incentives were applied to properly
value spectrum use. Concomitantly, the congestion problem
would decrease.
If a licensee no longer desires to use the spectrum, that
assignment should be made to another who values it more
highly. There is no simple market mechanism whereby a
licensed operator may transfer his license or part of it to
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another [10, p. 19]. Nor may the licensed operator decide
to use that portion of the spectrum for a use other than
that for which the license was issued, despite his ability
to realize a higher rate of return on his investment were
the latter alternative chosen. 3y conforming to current
practices, the operator's decision is socially inefficient,
as the opportunity cost is the profit difference of the two
alternatives all other things being equal. Likewise, if
another individual were able to obtain greater efficiency
through his application of that same portion of the spectrum
than the present license holder, then he should be able to
purchase the license. The value of the spectrum to the
purchaser would determine the price. Similarly, if the
original licensee decided that he required only a portion
of the spectrum he now held, then to optimize spectrum usage
he should be permitted to sell the unused portion to one who
could provide a greater return on its use.
Allocative efficiency requires that only the most
profitable choices of spectrum uses be undertaken. In the
light of regulatory inefficiency it is necessary to determine
if, in fact, a market can perform as well. Essential ele-
ments of the market must exist and the benefits gained must
outweigh the costs incurred by market imperfections.
B. RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN A SPECTRUM MARKET
1. Market Factors
Given a purely competitive market, an efficient
price system can produce an allocation scheme whereby no
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reallocation of the resource can benefit one individual
without doing some disservice to another. Such Pareto-
optimality is the goal of an allocative mechanism. Moreover,
the use of price as an incentive allows the individual to
set a valuation on the amount he or she is able to utilize
vis-a-vis the gains foreseeable in another investment. In
the context of the market, the price of a commodity provides
information on society's valuation of the commodity and pro-
vides a self-adjusting mechanism which accommodates changes
in technology, substitutional effects, and consumer choice.
Any allocative scheme based on economic techniques
must consist of at least 3 basic elements; with any
omissions the market would fail [1, p. III-2] . First, the
resource in question must have a positive price. At zero
price, demand will decrease only when attempts to use the
resource are frustrated by extreme congestion. As an
example, there is no value to the user to enter a freeway
where the congestion is so great that travel is made impos-
sible. There is no incentive to use the resource because
the resource, i.e., the capacity for high speed travel no
longer exists. The next best alternative is then chosen.
With the institution of a positive price there is a tangible
reward for using less of the resource.
Given a positive price, time ordered investment pref-
erences can be made. Investment choices are based, in part,
on net present value. That is, the time stream of future
returns discounted at an appropriate rate must exceed the
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present and future discounted costs. In the case of spectrum
it may be less costly for the user to defer purchase rather
than obtain it now and use it inefficiently. Similarly,
based on a time valued preference ordering, it may be less
expensive to purchase spectrum now and hold it for future
use. Regardless of the investment strategy adopted, a posi-
tive price permits individual choice over time.
Implicit in this price system is the role technology
plays in determining price. A spectrum market would allow
the user to make a rational choice of spectrum quantity and
equipment technology. If a full range of technological
options are made available to the consumer, he or she should
be afforded the opportunity to determine on an individual
basis the amount of each input resource for profit
maximization.
A second major element is the need for a mechanism
to determine an optimum price. This mechanism is the market
which, must allow a free exchange of information to all poten-
tial entrants. It must attempt to provide an accurate
reflection of all social costs involved, minimize transaction
costs, and accommodate changes in technology and consumer
demand
.
The third major element is the degree of freedom pro-
vided by the market for the transferability of the resources.
The original owner may no longer realize an acceptable rate
of return on his investment, while a potential owner may be
able to earn a higher return. Then, maintenance of efficient
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resource allocation dictates that the user's rights be trans-
ferred to the new entrant. Limiting transferability would
require the original owner to make costly adjustments to
maintain an acceptable level of profitability and require
him to forego other more profitable investment opportunities.
2. Spectrum Input to the Production Function
To more fully appreciate the degree to which an
administrative allocation method affects the manner in which
resource allocation decisions are made by the firm, it is
necessary to investigate the firm's decision rules for profit
maximization at the desired quantity of output. If the firm
is in the telecommunications business, the production func-
tion can be characterized as:
Q = f (K,S)
where Q is the quantity of telecommunications service
provided,
S is the amount of spectrum utilized, and
K is the amount of all other inputs and represents capi-
talization, labor administrative and development costs, etc.
For purposes of this discussion a rigorous definition of
spectrum units is unnecessary; a unit of spectrum can be
considered as a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum
described by frequency and bandwidth. This is not to say
that in a practical market scheme a more rigorous and
legally acceptable definition may not be mandatory.
Certain basic assumptions are necessary. The first
is that the firm, having chosen a desired level of output,
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will rationally opt to minimize total production costs.
Secondly, the production function is assumed to be concave.
The last, but perhaps most important, is that social costs
are fully internalized. This is a necessary condition for
minimization of social cost.
Figure 1 depicts the isoquants of the production
function QQ - Q . . The ridge lines R, and R2 are the bounda-
ries of the set of all technically efficient production
possibilities. That is, for any point on an isoquant within
the ridge lines it is impossible to produce more output
without an additional amount of at least one input. Sc c
represents a constraint imposed by technology on the amount
of bandwidth employed and is determined by what is currently
technologically infeasible, not by any social equity or
legal constraint.
The firm's total cost function is given by:
TC = f (nk., msl and is assumed to be linear for this dis-
cussion where n and m are the costs for a unit of k and s
respectively. The slope of the total cost curve is given
by 3K/8S which also represents the marginal rates of sub-
stitution. This is the rate one input may be substituted
for another while maintaining a constant output. Two isocost
curves are represented by C-, and C~. In the case where
spectrum use has zero cost, M = 0, the isocost function C,
is completely elastic. The obvious choice for a profit
maximizing firm is to use inputs in the amount of K, and S,













case, choosing point A is both a technically and economically
efficient operating point. No other combination of inputs
can produce Q~ units of output at any lower cost.
If, however, a positive price is imposed on the use
of the spectrum, some different mixture of inputs is required,
For n 7^ 0, C~ is the corresponding isocost curve with
tangency to Q 2 at B. Then K- and S„ are the required input
amounts for economic efficiency.
This argument can be expanded to show that as the
cost of spectrum increases, there should be a corresponding
decrease in the amount of spectrum utilized while the amount
of K utilized increases. The rational firm will seek the
least cost combination of inputs to produce the desired
amount of output. Concomitantly, for any number of techno-
logically efficient solutions there is only one economically
efficient operating choice.
Under the current regulatory practices of the FCC
the choice of inputs is restricted by prior determination
of the amount of spectrum to be used. This is done by both
the block allocation scheme and the channelization of that
allocation band [10, p. 3], For the profit maximizing firm,
input decisions are made along isospectrum curves and the
true costs of production are not reflected in the choice of
remaining inputs.
The FCC regulates spectrum usage by defining the
amount to be used. This amount is represented on Figure 2








Also, for all practical purposes, if the cost of using this
predetermined amount of spectrum is zero, then the firm will
operate at point C and utilize k.. amount of other inputs to
produce an output of Q~ . It is obvious that this amount is
technically efficient, but is it socially optimal? Because
the use of spectrum causes some social costs to be incurred,
then these must be born by those firms excluded by the
licensing procedure of the FCC. Only if point B and C
coincide, will the costs of k be socially optimal. This is
not the same as saying the use to which this firm will put
its portion of the spectrum will be socially optimal. Also,
if B 7* C, then a valuation of inefficiency can be given by
n(k~ - k~) - m(s^ - s~) where the social cost of spectrum
occupancy is used.
Given the bureaucratic nature of any regulatory body,
it is reasonable to assume that S D will not equal S and
that some misallocation of resources exists due to the lack
of a market determined price for spectrum. Since the regu-
lator must rely on imperfect information from all firms in-
volved in that particular telecommunications service, the
position of S reflects an average value. Implicit in this
position of SD is some level of technology which each firm
possesses or is able to acquire at a reasonable price. Given
the rapidly declining costs of new electronic equipments and
the slow administrative procedural method by which FCC
divisions are made, S_ is to the right of S~ and that givenR 2.




Two major opportunity costs which underly this dis-
cussion are the cost of unused existent technology and the
cost to society incurred by denying license to a petitioning
firm on the basis of insufficient spectrum. Because regula-
tion attempts to reduce transactions costs by replacing a
failed market, it is important that these two opportunity
costs are not greater than the transaction costs saved by
regulation [15, p. 12], Further, introducing market incen-
tives, i.e., price, may lead to a more socially efficient
solution than that realizable under regulation.
As Jackson states:
"We have a system suited to an era of slow techno-
logical change. It is a system which works best with
a relative abundance of spectrum resource. And it is
a system designed with great concern for the public
goods aspect of resource use" [25, p. 19].
To obtain an efficient price for spectrum, the true
social cost of spectrum must be calculated. But due to
the nature of spectrum externalities, the problem with
defining spectrum property rights, and the problems with
transaction and enforcement costs, setting and efficient
price may not be a simple matter.
Because there is no valuation placed directly on
the use of spectrum, it is difficult to assess the oppor-
tunity costs which are directly tied to the transferability
and use of a portion of the spectrum. To adequately incor-
porate the problem of transferability into a market mechanism
for spectrum allocation, and, indeed, to even establish a
market, some acceptable definition of spectrum property
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rights must be proposed. In addition, problems with exter-
nalities transaction costs, and enforcement costs must be
minimized to allow the market to function effectively. In
a spectrum market these are difficult issues and each must
be squarely dealt with.
C. MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
In the previous section production input decisions were
investigated under conditions which assumed that all exter-
nalities were fully internalized. This obviously is not
the case even in a market which is commonly termed competi-
tive in everyday usage. There will always be departures
from the optimum market conditions. In the case of a market
dealing in spectrum usage rights these imperfections may be
severe enough to cause market failure. The imperfections
dealt with here are definitional problems of property rights,
externalities of transmission, transaction costs, and
enforcement costs. Each is discussed to obtain an under-
standing of the limitations in a feasible spectrum market.
1. Property Rights
As a result of market action, the legal acquisition
of a good conveys certain property rights on the owner.
Exercising the right of ownership can produce externalities
which, are harmful or beneficial to others. What is of con-
cern here is that an efficient solution be reached whereby
all costs and benefits of utilizing the good are borne
entirely by the owner. Liability for one's actions deter-
mines only the responsible party, and the degree of freedom
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with which he may exercise the rights of ownership. It does
not determine the efficient solution [3, p. 8]. Illustrating
this point is Coase's example of the farmer suffering crop
damage from the roaming cattle of the neighboring rancher;
Demsetz states:
"Coase points out the efficiency of the solution with
respect to the number of cattle and the size of the
crops in the absence of exchange costs is independent
of whether the farmer or rancher is legally liable for
the damage" [15, p. 12].
A legal statement of liability is necessary only to
determine the course of action one party should take against
another. The prime concern is to produce a socially effici-
ent solution given that externalities exist [15, p. 12].
At best, electromagnetic radiation can be described
in a probabilistic sense. First, there is the difficulty
in defining the energy density at the wave front boundary
as it moves through space. Since air, water vapor and rain
can each, cause some variation in attenuation, the relation-
ship of attenuation to the square of the distance is only a
close approximation. Second, the propagation made can cause
any number of realizable paths given any set of frequencies
and atmospheric conditions. Third, is the effect of noise
on the signal, specifically man-made interference over which
some control may be exercised. Therefore, if the propaga-
tion path of a radiation wave is so ill-defined, how can
property rights for spectrum be defined to permit an effici-
ent market mechanism for spectrum allocation? It is impor-
tant to define at the outset what is involved. First, there
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is the ownership or control of a good. In the case of
spectrum control, the owner may choose to use or not use
spectrum for any purpose as he sees fit. If by not using
it he can realize a greater return then he should do so.
Secondly, he exercises control over its use in some manner
which may produce "side effects" or externalities. Harm-
ful externalities are interference to others. Right of use
in this case leads to a choice over the extent to which
externalities may be inflicted on others, either knowingly
or unknowingly [8, p. 15].
Defining property rights for spectrum is not a
straightforward problem. In most descriptions of property
rights the commodity is some tangible good; here two or
more people, given the appropriate technology, may be able
to utilize identical portions of spectrum. The idea that
there must be some strict geographical demarcation of
ownership is not a valid argument.
Use of the spectrum can create externalities which
must be taken into account in describing the limits of free-
dom for the property owner. In the case where the owner
is completely free to do as he chooses the resulting chaos
could be catastrophic to the industry, creating what has
been termed an "anarchy band" [26, p. 39]
.
Minasian lists four conditions which define a set
of property rights which would adequately incorporate the
necessary economic attributes. These are:
66

a. Emission rights - the right to transmit with
specifically defined radiation output
characteristics.
b. Admission rights - the right to refuse use of
the spectrum to another whose transmission
would occupy the same dimensions specified
in the emission rights.
c. Use - freedom to choose the type of legally
available service which best suits the
owner's needs.
d. Transferability - as with other resources, the
rights both of emission and admission either
in whole or in part may be transferred at
the discretion of the owner [42, p. 232].
DeVany et al . expand on these rights, providing greater
recognition of the technical problems but basically the
two definitions are similar [19/ p. 1512-29]. The latter
two are acceptable; however, there are some problems with
the first two. Concerning emission rights, the costs of
measuring the field density at any point in space may
exceed the gains of specific ownership. Since the energy
density of an electromagnetic wave at any distance from
the source is not easily quantified, a measurement system
may prove too costly to provide an accurate description of
the effects of transmission. This is especially true since
the electronics industry characterizes its equipment by
input specifications of transmitter power, frequency and
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antenna patterns. A whole new radiation measurement industry
would be required to adequately monitor all transmitters.
The problem with the second point is in determining
the source of unadmitted radiation. If some cost will be
incurred by not transmitting, then it is in the interest of
the interloper to transmit if the costs incurred in satis-
fying the legal owner are less. However, i f he cannot be
identified or if the cost of identification exceeds the gain
in reparation the owner may seek, then the interloper
should continue to transmit. This does not mean that if he
is identified, he will avoid the courts but it does point
out the problems associated with defining a property right
which may not prove acceptable from a social efficiency
point of view.
An alternate proposal not as all encompassing as
Minasian's, but which is much easier to accept is one where
transmission rights are stipulated in terms of the current
license. The current procedure requires that the equipment
the licensee intends to operate must meet certain technical
parameters. While such a proposal avoids the measurement
costs of determining boundary energy densities, they none
the less can, given an approximate probability function
for noise and propagation mode, yield a prediction of
boundary energy density. Measurement of such input param-
eters is part of the study of electromagnetic compatibility
and is recommended by JTAC and others as a means of coping
with the interference problem [27] . This proposal is
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closely aligned to that of Levin and Cornell. Levin's
apprehension over an explicit definition of rights is based
in part on the difficulty involved with propagation predic-
tion and the effects of spurious emissions [32, p. 91].
Cornell's proposal is based on the sheer practicability of
continuing a well-defined system of insuring technical
competency in radiation transmission [10 , p. 15].
The other essential feature of a system of rights
is transferability. The holder of rights must be free
within the law to dispose of his goods in the manner he
alone decides. It can be argued that for the greatest
efficiency, the holder should be allowed to transfer those
rights in part or in whole. If the current administrative
system were to be replaced by a market system, such free-
dom of choice must be made available.
The important feature of any rights system is that
it must provide a framework under which a determination can
be made which, decides who is liable in the event liability
claims are made [16J . Under such a system it is shown that
liability is not material in determining efficient alloca-
tion 115 f p. 12J . Some discussion of the externalities is
necessary for understanding their implication in the prices
and costs of a market.
2. Externalities
The benefits to society from the positive externali-
ties of spectrum allocation are straightforward. They in-
clude maritime safety, international connectivity, air
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mobile (aircraft coordination) , mutual coordination of
broadcasting frequencies, and world-wide radio navigation
systems, etc. These benefits are well-recognized, easy to
characterize, and should be preserved by an allocative
process using market incentives.
a. Negative Externalities
The costs of using any resource be it land,
air, water, or spectrum may not necessarily equate to the
costs incurred by the firm utilizing that resource. This
is especially true where use of that resource is considered
a "free good," i.e., at no cost to the user. For example,
by using the river as a source of cooling water, a power
plant raises the water temperature a few degrees. Down-
stream the fishing industry notices a decline in the catch
size because the fish, no longer breed as well as they did
in colder water. The power plant's cost for water amounts
to the cost of equipment necessary to handle the volume of
water needed, but by using the water they have caused a cost
to be incurred by the fishermen. Then the true social cost
is equal to the cost of equipment plus the losses suffered
by the fishermen. The effect on the fishing industry is
the negative externality of this production process. If
through environmental laws liability is placed on the power
plant, they can choose to pay the fishermen the difference
in revenues or to install additional equipment to cool the
water back to its original temperature, whichever is cheaper
Assuming zero transaction costs, the power utility now pays
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the true social cost of employing river water as a cooling
source.
The externalities of spectrum use are not
easily characterized and are an impediment to the definition
and enforcement of property rights in a spectrum market.
There are essentially three major externalities of trans-
mission [32, p. 91]. Each is derived from the unpredictable
path and interaction of radio signals. First is the prob-
lem of propagation uncertainty. Nighttime sky waves in the
AM band are a common example. While we may like to listen
to a Chicago station in New York, the New York station is
not impressed by the vagaries of electromagnetic propagation
which permits a distant station, such as the Chicago one
in this case, from interfering with and, indeed, obliterating
their own signal. The second source of externalities results
from the impossibility of confining a propagated wave to a
precise spatial volume or to cause the emitted energy to
cease propagating once past the intended receiver. While
antenna design can improve the directivity, nothing in cur-
rent technology can restrict the transmitted signal once it
departs the antenna. The end result is that energy from
adjacent channels may spill over causing interference.
Also, unless the transmitted frequency is of exceptionally
superior quality, harmonics transmitted, following the same
physical laws as the intended signal, can be an additional
source of interference. The third externality is the prob-
lem of intermodulation. As explained by Levin:
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" (The third externality arises) where several differ-
ent services operate simultaneously on different
frequencies but in the same limited physical area
(mountain tops, urban building roofs, naval vessels,
etc.) . Neither transmitter B or C alone would harm
A, but in C's presence B does harm A, through no
fault of his own, while C harms neither. A further
complication follows from the fact that interference
by B of A's reception in C's presence may be due
more to the low quality of A's receiver than to the
power of B's transmitter" [32, p. 92],
A more thorough discussion of these problems from
an engineering point of view is contained in supplement 6
of JTAC's Spectrum Engineering—the Key to Progress [27].
The implications of these three externalities raise
serious questions as to the viability of a market which
requires for its continued operation a precise definition
of the good for sale.
3. Transaction Costs
By doing business in the market place, transaction
costs are incurred. They may vary greatly from one market
to another; i.e., the transaction costs are a function of
the commodity purchased. In each transaction, costs are
incurred and it would be too simplistic to assume that a
spectrum market, given the definitional problem of property
rights could be expected to have minimal transaction costs.
These costs are appropriately defined:
"In order to carry out a market transaction, it
is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes
to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to
deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations
leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract,
to undertake the inspection needed to make sure




In a spectrum market, transaction costs can result
from the inability to adequately internalize all the exter-
nalities produced by electromagnetic radiation. If the
true costs are not assumed by the individual causing or
contributing to the interference, then unnecessary trans-
action costs are incurred in seeking relief from the effects
of these externalities [15, p. 13]. If one-to-one negotia-
tions are practical, these costs are minimal. A payment
can be made in value equal to the damages incurred and the
process is ended. For example, consider the case of where
A's television reception is degraded by the transmissions
from B's amateur radio station on the next block. A looks
outside sees the antenna and assumes B the culprit. A
describes the problem he is experiencing to B, arguing that
he is sure that B's license requires control of the harmonic
emissions which, are causing the interference. B agrees and
purchases the necessary equipment to modify his station to
eliminate the harmful harmonics. The costs to A involve
determining the source and the value of his time in nego-
tiating the settlement. In B's case, the costs he incurs
are those of internalizing the negative externality of inter-
ference. Here transaction costs are minimal. What if not
only A but the entire neighborhood were affected by B's trans-
missions from a relocated antenna. Not only would additional
effort be consumed in locating the source of the problem
but B, once discovered, might have to negotiate with A through
Z. A serious problem may ensue as B attempts to placate all
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the TV viewers. It may that the combined efforts to reach
a settlement are not desirable. Hence, when the interaction
of the property right holders involved affects a large num-
ber of other individuals or in turn they are affected, then
it may be considered inefficient or inappropriate to enter
into private negotiations [3, p. 17].
Further, in the light of positive transaction costs,
it is necessary to determine if the regulatory mechanism of
the government can deal with the interference problem at
less cost than a market mechanism. With no recourse to a
more efficient government system, it may be more efficient
to ignore the costs of externalities. Simply, if the social
costs of externalities exceed the transaction costs neces-
sary to determine liability, then efficiency dictates that
transaction costs be incurred [3, p. 18].
4 . Enforcement Costs
The costs of policing the interference problem are
not currently known. Some attempts, however, have been made
to observe actual field conditions for compliance with
technical specifications. The FCC * s program, the Mobile
Microwave Monitoring Program attempts to accomplish just
that 138, p. 236] . A market system would not provide such
a service. However, it is conceivable that such a service
could be offered by a private concern. If the source of
interference were unknown, then the individual would be
willing to pay the difference between the valuation of his
disrupted communications and the costs of the service,
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provided he had some reasonable assurance that the inter-
ference problem would be rectified.
The creation of a spectrum market has numerous pro-
ponents and not a few detractors. While control of inter-
ference may be beyond the capabilities of both government
or a market, there is a certain appeal in allowing market
forces to set a valuation on the spectrum in proportion to
demand.
The price established must not be so artificially
high that use of the spectrum is foregone for more costly
substitutes, nor must the cost inaccurately reflect the true
costs allowing congestion to continue unchecked.
D. SPECTRUM PRICING BASED ON MARGINAL COSTS
Marginal cost pricing equates the consumer's willingness
to pay for an additional unit of output with the cost of
producing that additional unit [11, p. 2], A balance is
reached between the social costs incurred by increased pro-
duction and consumer satisfaction derived from the additional
unit of output. In allocation decisions it is the cost of
an additional unit weighed against the satisfaction derived
from it which determines how resource allocations are to be
made. Thus, allocation decisions are said to be made at the
margin. In the long run, however, departures from marginal
cost pricing may be necessitated by additional revenue con-
straints, or by non-constant returns to scale, but these
conditions are not examined here.
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The idea of spectrum pricing based on marginal costs is
not new [31, p. 132-133]. Indeed, allocation decisions are
usually made at the margin for other resources. What is
needed is a practical mechanism for evaluating spectrum use
at the margin to yield an optimal price.
Of particular interest in spectrum pricing is optimal
price determination during periods of peak consumption. It
is during this peak period that the problem of interference
becomes significant. Peak period users should be required
to pay a price higher than that of the off-peak user because,
at the margin, the costs of production of that additional
peak unit of output are higher.
Developments in the extensive and intensive margins
have not matched the technologically increased demand for
spectrum [31, p. 22] . In the short run the availability of
spectrum can be considered constant. Then the problem as
seen from an allocation point of view is to set the price
sufficiently high so that the marginal cost of utilizing
the spectrum is consistent with the marginal capacity of
the resource. The consequence of marginal cost pricing is
that peak-period consumers will have to pay a price which
reflects the incremental costs of increasing capacity [12]
[59] [68] [69]. (For a dissenting opinion, see [48].)
In 19 57, Steiner reviewed the basic peak-load problem
under the assumptions stated below:
1. Demand for a non-storable quantity varies
over a given time period;
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2. approximation of constant demand can be made if
the time period is made small enough;
3. for each subperiod a different price can be
assigned;
4. constant returns to scale characterize the
technology of supply with capacity fixed over
the time period;
5. Pareto-ef f icient prices can be distinguished
for each subperiod [59].
The last point means that efficient subperiod prices have
off-peak prices equal to variable production costs and on-
peak prices individually covering variable costs and collec-
tively covering capacity costs.
This may appear patently unfair in that the off-peak
user can benefit from the capacity while the preponderance
of the costs are absorbed by the on-peak user [11, p. 135].
But, because of the on-peak user's desire for consumption
when incremental increases in capacity are the most costly,
he should cover these costs which would otherwise not be
incurred. In essence, peak-load pricing can be considered
as a method for charging a price equal to the actual costs
of production.
In this case of spectrum usage, the interest is not so
much on production as it is on the effects an additional
user has both on himself and on others when he attempts to
use the spectrum. The problem caused by externalities
requires that the peak-load condition be evaluated in terms
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of the additional congestion imposed on other spectrum
users by an additional user. Even though congestion models
for transportation are not specifically intended for the
spectrum interference problem, there are significant simi-
larities which can be investigated.
As a traveler enters a highway, costs of fuel, auto
depreciation, etc. are incurred. These are the private costs
to the individual. In addition, the traveler incurs the
cost of the additional time required to complete his journey
because the cumulative effect of all the cars on the road
is to slov; traffic down [41, p. 47]. The sum of this
individual average congestion cost and the individual's
average variable operating costs gives an average variable
cost. This is what the user is responsive to when he decides
on entering the freeway. However, the true social cost is
greater than what the traveler perceives because, by his use
of the freeway, additional costs have been imposed on others
[44, p. 19], As more travelers attempt to use the freeway,
the condition becomes more aggravated. This situation is
depicted in Figure 3. It is clear that as additional users
enter the freeway, a divergence between the average private
costs and the marginal social costs occurs [44, p. 16] . If
privately-perceived costs deviate from the marginal social
costs, then there exists the potential for a misuse of
resources. By imposing a congestion toll equal to the
difference between the private costs incurred by the user
and the marginal social cost, greater allocation efficiency
can be achieved.








Adapted from [4 3, p. 19]
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The state of spectrum management is analogous to the
congestion problem. For a fixed level of technology within an
allocation, there is a finite user capacity within any
given time and spatial domain. This is the short-run situation.
Because the cost of spectrum use involves only the cost of
appropriate equipment, i.e., private costs, an inequality
exists between private costs and the marginal social cost
of spectrum use. The social costs of externalities which
increase with each additional user plus the average private
costs represent the true cost of spectrum use. The initial
user has no need to internalize costs. However, as addi-
tional users enter, the ability of the spectrum to accommo-
date the increased demand may decrease proportional to the
congestion present. That is, if demand increases persist,
then at some level of congestion unacceptable interference
occurs.
If an empirical relationship is assumed, where an average
level of interference is defined as a function of total
social cost and spectrum use density, then there are two
important implications T44, p. 16]. First, as the number of
spectrum users increases the additional social costs caused
by these users steadily increases. Secondly, for any allo-
cation band there is some technologically dependent capacity
which defines the maximum acceptable level of interference.
The marginal social cost can be defined as the cost an
additional user incurs plus the costs an additional user
imposes on others by increasing the level of interference
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or the waiting time imposed by channel saturation. Queuing
time in a heavily used single-channel mobile radio is an
example of the costs imposed on others . The difference be-
tween marginal social costs and average private costs
reflects the increased costs an additional user imposes on
those currently using that allocation. Put differently,
if the user could be induced not to use spectrum or at
least not as much, he would reduce the aggregate cost to
other users. If he were indifferent, then the costs born
by the user and those imposed on current users, evaluated
at the margin, would dictate the more efficient choice.
That is, if the new user's marginal cost exceeds the aggre-
gate marginal cost of current users, the new user should be
required to pay the higher amount.
The marginal cost price derived for use of the spectrum
should consist of individual user costs plus a fee as shown
in Figure 3. The fee is fixed at an amount equal to
uninternalized costs. The difference between the true cost
to society and those costs assumed by the user are the
uninternalized costs.
Then, for any level of capacity a price could be deter-
mined. This price would then indicate the willingness of
the individual to accept all social costs involved in spec-
trum use and would help curtail demand for spectrum by elim-
inating the indifferent user present because of the current
no-cost policy for spectrum usage. A lower fee would pro-
mote spectrum usage with associated social costs greater
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than the costs incurred by the operator. On the other hand,
an excessive fee would discourage potentially efficient
users, causing them, in some cases, to invest in artifici-
ally attractive spectrum substitutes.
When then is a socially efficient price? As seen in
Figure 3, even if the spectrum user correctly values the
costs of using spectrum as he perceives them, the amount he
would be willing to pay would be less than that calculated
from the marginal social cost of spectrum. The perceived
price must be adjusted upward in an amount equal to the fee
as depicted in Figure 3. This arrangement would yield a
socially optimal price.
By adopting an auction technique, a Pareto-optimal
valuation can be made of the private costs the user incurs
through use of the spectrum. But, since the user is only
influenced by the effects interference would have on him,
he is not compelled to bid the true social^ cost of spectrum
usage. A fee is required to obtain the correct price. As
noted previously, spectrum fees have some fundamental prob-
lems. In this instance, though, determining the correct
amount is simplified because part of the total cost includes
the previously determined private cost. Since the primary
concern in spectrum management is to decrease interference,
a fee which covers the administrative costs of conducting
an auction and handling interference complaints might serve
as an appropriate surrogate measure. It is thought that
administrative costs for a more elaborate fee determination
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mechanism would be excessive. By a combination of auction
price and fee, a price solution would be determined which
is an approximation to the optimal price in the presence of
transactions costs. This is usually referred to as a second
best solution [4, p. 265].
If a limited market structure for spectrum is assumed
and allocations are described by bandwidth and legally
permissible use, then as the capacity constraint imposed on
each allocation is reached a corresponding price increase
occurs. Between allocations, a difference in maximum will-
ingness to pay for an additional unit of spectrum causes a
price increase in one allocation relative to another.
Reapportionment of the allocation to a point of price equal-
ity is indicated.
If the allocation method were inflexible, then the addi-
tional consumer surplus captured by an excessive price in
an already congested allocation could be regarded as a tax,
if adjacent, substitutable allocations were not at capacity
In such a situation, spectrum allocation would not be
efficient. If the capacity, i.e., bandwidth, of the highly
demanded allocation were increased at the expense of an
allocation experiencing less demand then by reapportioning





This market recommendation incorporates three require-
ments which have been developed:
1. Frequency coordination
2. Responsiveness to technology
3. Spectrum pricing.
Each requirement is amplified below.
This proposal uses input rights and develops a market
mechanism which is designed to allow the individual firm
to make optimum resource allocation decisions based on
what is perceived as the marginal rate of technical substi-
tution between capital investments and spectrum.
A. REQUIREMENTS
1. Frequency Coordination
The first efforts by the government in regulating
access to the spectrum were to provide a centralized modus
operandi for frequency coordination. Realizing the bene-
fits attainable by common agreement over frequency usage,
user acceptance was immediate. The system has evolved,
however, into one completely regulated which suffers from
an inability to respond to demand. Any market system pro-
posed must also capture the benefits of frequency coordina-
tion while removing the constraints imposed by and the
economic implications of resource regulation. The positive




2. Responsiveness to Technology
Lower electronic costs have created a demand for
spectrum unmatched by technological improvements in the
extensive and intensive margins of the spectrum. However,
any proposed system must be responsive to the additional
spectrum supply created by technological advances. As
shown above, the firms' decision rule on resource alloca-
tion is dependent on the regulator's choice of spectrum
bandwidth available for a particular service. To permit
economic efficiency in resource allocation decisions, the
user must be allowed an unrestrained choice in the band-
width requirements of their particular system. Because
the regulated system requires a bandwidth based on previous
technology, the allocation decisions are suboptimal. A
market system which provides the opportunity to obtain an
efficient amount of spectrum decreases the opportunity cost




Spectrum pollution or congestion is a function of
both the increased demand for spectrum caused by lower cost
electronics and the supply of spectrum available. Since
for any sufficiently small period the spectrum supply is
constrained by the technology available, the resulting
situation can be described as a peak-loading problem. By
applying both peak-load pricing theory and congestion theory
of transportation economics to the spectrum allocation and
assignment problem, a marginal social cost is derived to
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provide a basis for efficient spectrum price. The marginal
price produced includes the costs of congestion imposed on
others by the additional user. The marginal pricing method
provides a mechanism for valuation of an additional unit
of spectrum to the firm. By adopting a marginal pricing
method, a more accurate valuation of the social cost of
fully internalized spectrum is achieved.
B. ELEMENTS OF THE MARKET MODEL
This model attempts to incorporate the requirements above
into a viable allocative mechanism using market incentives
as the dyamnic force. It is not designed to provide the
absolute answer to all the problems of spectrum allocation
but focuses on only one of the many potential markets in
spectrum allocation. It is intended for use primarily in
the Land Mobile Radio Service (LMS) . LMS offers an excellent
opportunity to apply economic techniques for the following
reasons
:
"1. Many land mobile channels are congested in many
parts of the country, while some channels are
under-utilized in those same areas;
2. Several technological methods are available for
increasing the efficiency of spectrum utiliza-
tion, but are not being employed, or are only
being partially employed;
3. The FCC has received proposals to allocate addi-
tional frequencies for the LMS, some of which
it has acceded to, without finding a way to
induce users to employ known methods of increa-
sing the utilization of the spectrum;
4. Continued growth of the LMS will increase loading
and congestion (recent growth has been on the
order of 12 percent per year, with 100,000 appli-




The band assignment method of Dunn and Owens allows the
owner to assign portions of the band to other users as a
form of secondary rights [21]. For example, if a new type
of mobile radio system were to become available that would
permit high quality service to be obtained from 1/5 of the
presently used band, 3/5 of the band might be sold to an-
other user group for enough to pay for converting to the
new spectrum-efficient system and 1/5 might be retained to
allow for future growth [1, p. IX-39] [20].
The market model proposed in this thesis articulates a
mechanism for efficient handling of these bandwidth portions.
Indeed, by explicitly definina these portions of bandwidth,
spectrum pricing techniques can be incorporated.
The model provides for complete freedom of choice of the
technology utilized, but requires the user to maintain strict
adherence tc the specifications of input parameters which
are necessary conditions for issuing the license. This
model provides the incentive for optimizing spectrum use
both by use of improved technology and by imposing a con-
gestion toll on additional users. By pricing spectrum use
at the margin, the cost incurred by society for an addi-
tional user is more fully internalized.












Each element provides an integral part of the market
mechanism designed to be responsive to the system require-
ments detailed.
1 . Allocation Determination
Given the varying elasticities of substitution
among different portions of the spectrum, the difficulty
in defining acceptable property rights and the potential
loss of frequency coordinated benefits, a suboptimal allo-
cation of spectrum must be made initially. This allocation
will be designated for a particular use only to avoid elec-
tromagnetic compatibility problems associated with adjoining
or intermingled disparate services. The frequency range
of each allocation is controlled by the differences in mar-
ginal products of bandwidth and price between adjacent
allocations [54, p. 14] [25, p. 153]. That is, if the peak-
load price of one allocation exceeds that of the next, then
efficiency dictates transfer of spectrum to the first allo-
cation in the amount necessary to produce equal marginal
products in both allocations. An evaluation period equal
to that of an individual license period would be used to
calculate an average marginal oroduct for each allocation.
If transfer of spectrum was necessary, it would occur on
license expiration of the assignments involved by allowing
the FCC to buy the needed bandwidth at the bid price.
This allocation method can provide a dynamic mechanism for
increasing supply in a highly demanded service without
resorting to intensive or extensive expansion of available
supply and the concomitant research and development costs.
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2 . Subassignment Bandwidth
In lieu of administratively defining the bandwidth
of an assignment equal to a regulator's assessment of cur-
rent technology, a small unit of spectrum, the subassignment,
is offered. In some respects, the subassignment is much
like Jackson's Space Segments (SS's) [25, p. 76]. The
dimensions in bandwidth are material only in that they
represent a unit of bandwidth which cannot support the
desired service with a reasonably foreseeable technology.
Although administratively defined, there is no need for pre-
cision in the information needed for an adequate decision.
This subassignment is sufficiently small to accom-
modate two market requirements. First, by providing
smaller units of spectrum the individual firm retains the
capability of determining its optimum allocation scheme.
Implicit in this feature is the system's ability to incor-
porate new technology without penalizing the firm for
making that choice as is now the case where spectrum is a
free good.
New technology can provide identical system effec-
tiveness without utilizing the 25 KHz bandwidth and narrow
band FM modulation now required by the FCC. Recent techno-
logical developments, although not entirely tested, indi-
cate that from seven to ten times as many voice channels
could be obtained from the VHF and UHF allocations for land
mobile radio [36, p. 34] . This feature provides incentive
to invest in more spectrum efficient equipment, thereby
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stimulating technological development in both the extensive
and intensive margins of spectrum.
Secondly, the use of subassignments permits the
firm to place an individual valuation on an additional unit
of spectrum at an approximation to the margin. By decrea-
sing the bandwidth of the subdivision, the marginal price
per unit of spectrum is reached in the limit. For reasons
of practicality, an approximation of the limit is required.
Pricing spectrum at the margin permits efficient
resource allocation. However, market proposals to date have
used essentially an average value for spectrum in deter-
mining price to the firm. While this price may be a marginal
one to the market, it is not a marginal price to the indi-
vidual firm. Hence, this proposal permits the firm to
respond to changes in technology and market demand in an
individualized and more efficient manner.
By providing spectrum subassignments in the market,
the firm can, for any available technology, evaluate the
substitutability of production inputs at the margin to ob-
tain resource allocation efficiency.
3. Price Determination
Price determination consists of two separate parts:
an auction price and a regulatory fee. The auction tech-
nique for a spectrum market is chosen because of the rapidity
with which the new owner is chosen and the minimal trans-
action costs involved. The English auction, where the high-
est bidder pays the second highest price is favored for
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several reasons. First, the mutual best response bidding
strategy is relatively simple: it is optimal for the bidder
to bid the true value for the subassignment auctioned.
Also, the probability of winning is independent of the
profits realized when the winner pays the second highest
bid [1, p. VIII-21] . Secondly, Vickery has shown that in
general the English auction leads to Pareto-optimal results
[61] . This is especially important in this model because
it reduces the possibility of a self-imposed tax by over-
bidding to obtain the n subassignment for the technology
chosen. Third, the English auction produces a higher vari-
ance of the winning bid which is not preferred by a risk
averse seller [1, p. VIII-21] . Since the FCC is to act in
the "public interest," this factor is not significant.
However, to insure propriety in payment, all bids must be
made public.
The second portion of the spectrum price is an
administrative fee which is assessed to cover the cost of
the auction system and the costs of enforcement. As seen
in Chapter V, in the face of externalities, average private
costs do not equal marginal social costs. To obtain a
socially efficient price a fee equal to the difference be-
tween average private costs and the marginal social cost
must be included. In the interests of minimizing the ex-
pense of determining an optimum fee, a surrogate measure of
administrative costs is employed in this model.
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4 . Titles and License
A successful bid provides the individual title to
that subassignment. Presentation of titles in the required
amount of bandwidth for the particular transmission system
chosen is sufficient to award station license. The current
system for determining power output, antenna height, would
still be maintained because of the experience in this method,
and input specification for line-of-sight propagation pro-
vides a close approximation of the radiation density and
potential useful range of the equipment operated.
A centralized market is used for minimization of
transaction costs. It provides a forum for information
exchange and a means of obtaining up-to-date information
on current title holders. In essence, it would allow tne
FCC or a duly authorized body to conduct the auction, act
as a spectrum broker and record license and title registra-
tion. Because of the nature of line-of-sight transmission,
a number of regional offices and markets would permit a
more individualized response to the demand for spectrum
in two ways. It would allow reallocation of spectrum by
geographic region not nationwide as now done. It would
provide a geographic insulation between regions that may
have considerably different demand characteristics for a
service. Hence, the price paid reflects regional demand.
Secondly, it would allow a faster response time in issuing




The sale of a subassignment title to another is not
prohibited. The only restriction placed on transfer of a
title is that the new owner be required to register with
the regional office. This provides an opportunity to update
the listing of current title holders and it serves to pro-
tect the buyer by allowing a title search to be performed
[54, p. 17]. This would prevent sale of illegally or fra-
dulently acquired titles to an unsuspecting buyer.
If the title holder desires, he may offer some or
all of his titles at a regularly scheduled FCC sponsored
auction rather than placing them for sale himself. This
flexibility permits minimization of transaction costs by
providing a centralized mechanism for title transfer. The
potential buyer need only contact the regional office to
obtain a complete listing of cleared titles which will be
auctioned. Also available would be the current prices for
recent subassignment sales. Thus, the potential buyer
would be able to obtain information, specific for his geo-
graphic area, that would be necessary for the firm to make




This feature may be the single most important ele-
ment to a successful spectrum market. There are actually
two time periods involved and each can have a major impact
on optimal spectrum pricing. The first is the frequency
of government sponsored auctions and second, the length of
time prior to mandatory title reauctioning.
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The length of time between auctions is important to
alleviate unnecessary transaction costs by too lengthy a
period in which spectrum may be used inefficiently. Also,
if the auctions are too frequent, there would be a tendency
to offer bids which are not true valuations to the user but
are essentially those of the previous auction.
Mandatory reauctioning of the license would occur at
an interval sufficiently long to permit full depreciation of
the licensed equipment. The period would commence on issu-
ance of the title. If the current title holder wished to
retain a title he now held, participation in the auction
would be required. If the firms' bid were unsuccessful, then
title would pass to the successful bidder at the second
highest price bid with payment made to the previous title
holder. The rationale for mandatory reauctioning is that it
forces the firm to reevaluate its resource allocation
decisions in the light of current market competition. It
requires the firm which is inefficiently using spectrum to
bear the financial burden of its inefficiency if continued
operation is desired.
In addition, the competition would stimulate tech-
nology. If the firm decides that the titles now held would
be too expensive under current market conditions to success-
fully bid on all of them, then a decision could be made to
make a determined bid for only a fraction of the titles now
held and finance newer equipment requiring fewer titles
from the proceeds of the uncontested titles. This option
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would prevent the firm from placing exorbitantly high bids
to re-obtain the current held titles. Such behavior would
result if the current equipment is over-valued. While the
sunk cost of the equipment should be of no economic concern
when faced with a resource allocation decision, there would
be a tendency to overstate the value of existing assets at
the expense of socially inefficient spectrum usage.
If the title duration is set too short, then the
bid would be high to protect the capital investment that
the equipment represents. The difference between the true
valuation and the successful bid price, if the latter were
higher, would represent a tax on undepreciated capital
assets which is neither intended or desired. If the period
were too long, then the firm would avoid evaluating spectrum
at its true social value and would provide no realized
incentive to acquire newer spectrum-saving technology.
C. EVALUATION
A key point of contention may be that the bidding
strategy adopted for the final necessary subassignment is
suboptimal. To insure winning, the bid may be made artifici-
ally high. However, if successful, only the second highest
bid price need be paid which offers some protection from
self-taxation. If another firm has the same idea, the
actual selling price may be considerably higher. While it
could be argued that an inefficient price has been set, it
is also reasonable to indicate that this higher price is,
indeed, a truer indication of spectrum valuation at the
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margin to the individual user. A more detailed analysis
would be required to determine the optimal bidding strategy
given the requirement to complete a set of titles.
There are no considerations given to a user which
require a last subassignment. If their bid is unsuccessful,
they can resell the titles or obtain more spectrum-efficient
equipment. If a competitive price is to be established,
there can be no guarantee of bidding success. Freedom to
fail is an essential ingredient in competition. As conges-
tion increases, it winnows out the marginal user.
Another possible result of this model may be the
creation of a future market in subassignment titles. Specu-
lation against future orices may provide greater stability
in prices. Also, it would provide options for potential
buyers to purchase subassignments . Since there is no
requirement that a subassignment title be used to obtain a
license, it could be traded like any other commodity. If
the investor's present value of future sales were greater
than current market prices, it would be more efficient for
the investor to hold the title for future sale.
No consideration is given in this model as to the
legality of this proposal. Indeed, there is considerable
conflict over who currently owns the spectrum, and whether
the government can assume ownership with intent to sell
rights to spectrum use. Also, under current law the FCC
may not be empowered to collect the proceeds of the initial
auction. These issues should not constrain the proposal.
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If they, in fact, can provide a greater allocative effici-





This thesis reviews the nature of electromagnetic propa-
gation and the development of governmental regulation
which seeks to control the interference resulting from
unrestricted use of the spectrum. Also described are pro-
posals for the introduction of economic incentives into the
spectrum allocation mechanism. These are of two distinct
types. The first group provides for a free market where
spectrum allocation is accomplished in a competitive market
by defining a system of property rights which allows the
spectrum to be traded as if it were any other commodity.
The second group proposes a limited market structure which
defines the rights of the user in terms of technical input
specifications. Additionally, the second group confines
its economic proposals to individual services, recognizing
the relative inelastic substitutability among different fre-
quency ranges of the spectrum.
Next, the production function of the firm is investi-
gated to ascertain the effects of a positive spectrum price
on the choice of telecommunication input quantities. The
central argument is that the firm in seeking to make an
optimal choice must evaluate costs at the margin. By pricing
spectrum at the margin, not only will the firm be able to
approach, economic efficiency but such marginal valuation
can serve as an explicit indicator of the relative valuation
of spectrum in different spectrum markets. Thus, allocations
can be adjusted to more appropriately reflect spectrum demand
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Derived from the preceding discussions, this thesis pro-
poses a limited market for the land mobile radio service.
Its main features are decentralized control, subassignments
,
pricing method, and title transferability. This market
recognizes that demand elasticities for spectrum vary with
geographic area and that a responsive market must recognize
this fact. Therefore, while the controlling agency may
serve as the focal point for the spectrum market, the sphere
of influence is restricted to a specific portion of the
country. This would permit a more flexible allocation
scheme than currently available and would free regional users
from the restrictions of nationwide allocation procedures.
The subassignment permits the technical and operational
freedom necessary for optimizing the use of spectrum. This
feature allows the user to determine spectrum bandwidth
requirements in trade-off with equipment requirements. The
user would no longer be constrained by the fixed amount of
spectrum it considered necessary for continued telecommuni-
cation operation. Indeed, if demand continues to escalate,
a mechanism is provided to allow the use of more technically
advanced equipment, without penalizing the user as is now
the case.
The pricing method is comprised of two portions. The
first part uses the English auction technique to determine
the true value of the subassignment to the bidder. Since
the successful bid represents only a portion of the marginal
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social costs, a fee is imposed using administrative and
enforcement costs as a surrogate measure.
The feature of transferability allows the user to
divest portions of his acquired spectrum under market valu-
ation conditions. That is, if the title holder could
realize an economic gain by sale of portion of his titles,
then he is free to do so. The only restriction on transfer-
ability is the requirement to reauction all titles after
they have been held for a prescribed length of time. In
this manner, title holders would be continually required
to assess their current spectrum needs in the light of cur-
rent market conditions.
As technology continues to offer greater capabilities
at cheaper prices, the demand for spectrum can only be
expected to escalate. The demands on administrative spec-
trum assignment will only get worse. 3y adopting economic
incentives to conserve spectrum usage and by removing
legislative restrictions which impede efficient use of the
spectrum, the economic potential of the spectrum can be
more fully explored. This thesis provides a feasible,
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